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Abstract
Land reform in South Africa has paid less attention to the creation of fair and viable post-
apartheid urban human settlements than it has to rural land reform. While expropriation 
of land with or without compensation will deliver land, the question as to what happens 
post-expropriation has not been addressed. A reconsideration and redesign of the 
South African legal, policy and institutional frameworks, and spatial planning instruments 
are required, in order to enable the process of urban land reform to deliver on the 
development of sustainable human settlements. Since a number of countries have 
successfully dealt with large-scale restructuring and redevelopment, an examination of 
the methods employed in two countries, namely Rwanda, post-the genocide in 1994, 
and The Netherlands, post-World War II, is undertaken to facilitate that process. 
Keywords: Land reform, national reconstruction, settlement development, 
South Africa, Rwanda, The Netherlands 
GRONDHERVORMING (EN MENSLIKE NEDERSETTING) POST-
ONTEIENING: ’N FOKUSVERSKUIWING NA DIE IMPERATIEF VAN 
‘VOLHOUBARE MENSLIKETTINGSONTWIKKELING’
Grondhervorming in Suid-Afrika het minder aandag geskenk aan die skepping 
van stedelike regverdige en leefbare post-apartheid menslike nedersettings, as 
aan landelike grondhervorming. Alhoewel onteiening van grond met of sonder 
vergoeding wel grond beskikbaar sal stel, is die vraag eerder wat ná onteiening 
gebeur. Suid-Afrika se regs-, beleids- en institusionele raamwerke, en ruimtelike 
beplanningsinstrumente moet heroorweeg en herontwerp word, sodat die proses 
van stedelike grondhervorming kan voldoen aan die ontwikkeling van volhoubare 
menslike nedersettings. Omdat daar lande is wat grootskaalse herstrukturering en 
herontwikkeling suksesvol aangepak het, word ondersoek ingestel na die metodes 
wat in twee lande, naamlik Rwanda, na die 1994-volksmoorde, en Nederland, na die 
Tweede Wêreldoorlog, aangewend is om daardie proses te fasiliteer.
Sleutelwoorde: Grondhervorming, nasionale heropbou, Nederland, nedersetting 
ontwikkeling, Rwanda, Suid-Afrika
NTLAFATSO EA METSE KAMORA KHUTLISO EA LEFATSHE: TSEPAMISO EA 
MAIKUTLO BOHATONG BA NTSHETSOPELE E TSETSITSENG EA METSE
Phetoho ea tsamaiso ea lefatshe naheng ea Afrika Borwa e shebane ho fetola metse 
ea mahaeng ho feta ho kenyeletsa toka khahong ea metse ea litoroppong kamora 
nako ea aparateiti. Le hoja ho khutlisa 
lefatshe, eba ka ho fana ka matshediso 
kapa che, ho tla tlisa lefatshe ho ba bang 
ba le hlokang, potso e so kang e arajoa 
ke hore na hotla etsahalang kamora 
hore lefatshe le khutle. Ho hlokahala 
phetoho ea melao le meralo ea thero ea 
lefatshe molemong oa ho netefatsa hore 
phetoho ea lefatshe e tlisa ntlafatso 
e tsitsitseng ea metse e litoropong. 
Kaha ho se ho ntse ho ena le linaha tse 
kileng tsa fetola tsamaiso le ntlafatso ea 
lefatshe, boithuto bona bo sebelisitse 
mehlala ea naha ea Rwanda kamora 
ntoa ea 1994, le naha ea Netherlands 
kamora Ntoa ea Bobeli ea Lefatshe.
1. INTRODUCTION
Land reform in South Africa 
is both an objective in its own 
right – correcting the injustices of 
historical spatial dispossession and 
impoverishment – and a crucial tool 
in the realisation of multiple other 
objectives that relate mainly to rural 
land, and as such neglecting, to a 
large extent, the urban context of 
land reform (Pienaar, 2014: 647-648). 
The objectives of the Constitution and 
subsequent land-reform legislation 
were land redistribution, land-tenure 
reform and land restitution, with the 
main focus on rural land. Since the 
Property Valuation Act No. 17 of 2014 
(PVA) that must apply in land-reform 
expropriations defines ‘land reform’ 
to include ‘land development’, the 
creation of socially fair and viable 
post-apartheid human settlements 
in urban areas is now an objective 
of land reform (RSA, 2014b). 
While recognition is given to 
the importance of meeting the 
overall objective and sharing the 
view of many both in and outside 
South Africa that its resolution is way 
overdue, the authors also concur 
with others that urban land reform 
has received far too little attention 
(Cousins, 2016). This is clear from 
the inclusion of ‘urban land reform’ 
and ‘spatial transformation’ in the 
brief of the Presidential Advisory 
Panel on Land Reform and 
Agriculture, established as a result of 
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the parliamentary review process on 
expropriation without compensation 
during 2018 (RSA, 2019d: iv, 5, 11; 
RSA, 2019a: 15). This imbalance 
must be corrected, as the successful 
realisation of urban land reform is not 
concluded when the land is returned, 
or financial compensation paid. It is 
at the moment of land release when 
a much longer process of building 
a new kind of settlement – one that 
has been well-considered, properly 
planned for, adequately budgeted for, 
and is true to the ethos of restoration 
and equity that underlies the main 
objective – is put into motion. 
The fundamental transformation 
associated with the realisation of 
urban land reform is not a once-off 
step, but rather a pursuit that will 
require at least a generation or two 
of sustained focus on, investment 
in, and support of a collaborative 
process of settlement building. 
In 2018, Parliament accepted 
that the property clause in the 
Constitution should be amended 
to provide for expropriation without 
compensation for purposes of 
land reform. Expropriation without 
compensation is often viewed as 
the ‘silver bullet’ that will provide 
land for all in South Africa. Whether 
this is, in fact, the case is debatable 
(Pienaar, 2019). However, the case 
is that land is urgently required for 
settlement in, or close to urban 
areas. How that land is acquired is 
irrelevant, and the authors argue 
that expropriation with or without 
compensation should not be the 
pivot on which land reform turns. 
The debate should be about the 
implementation of a programme that 
progressively utilises land reform 
in the development of safe, secure 
and sustainable urban human 
settlements. The implementation 
of such a programme should 
commence with a thorough review 
and even a fundamental redraft of 
development and spatial planning 
acts, frameworks, plans, and 
policies produced post-1994.
In order to assist in adequately 
dealing with the challenge of large-
scale, urban spatial transformation 
post-expropriation or acquisition 
of land as part of land reform in 
South Africa, international examples 
of large-scale urban redevelopment 
and spatial transformation can 
provide insights. While many 
countries have been through such 
a process, two examples - one in 
Africa and one in Europe - were 
chosen for this purpose, namely 
Rwanda, post-the genocide in 1994, 
and The Netherlands, post-World 
War II. Both these countries saw 
it as a priority to implement a set 
of integrated policies, legislation 
and plans; they realised that 
measures needed to be implemented 
expeditiously and they related 
specifically to spatial redevelopment 
of urban areas. Moreover, their plans 
were ambitious and successful. 
The methodology employed is mainly 
comparative, but also historical and 
descriptive. The aim is to learn what 
it took (The Netherlands), and what 
it is taking (Rwanda) to turn around 
dire situations where reconstruction 
and redevelopment were required, 
and what ‘insights’ they offer in 
guiding the process of reconsidering 
and remaking the legal, policy and 
institutional frameworks, and spatial 
planning instruments in South Africa.




In this section, Rwanda is engaged 
as an example of a country 
that has made serious work of 
reconstructing a country and 
healing a divided nation, as well 
as embarking on a settlement 
planning and redevelopment 
drive. The Netherlands is 
engaged as an example of a 
country that embarked on a 
national and urban reconstruction 
project post-World War II. 
2.1 Rwanda
On 6 April 1994, the aeroplane 
carrying the then Presidents of 
Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi, 
both of whom were Hutus1 (the 
majority ethnic group in Rwanda), 
was shot down as it was preparing 
to land in the Rwandan capital, 
Kigali (Hilsum, 1994; Howard, 2014). 
Despite there being no evidence as to 
the identity of the perpetrators, it was 
immediately attributed to the Tutsis 
(a minority ethnic group in Rwanda). 
Soon thereafter, radio broadcasts 
of hate speech encouraged Hutus 
to kill all the Tutsis in the country 
(Hilsum, 1994; HMDT, 2019). 
Within hours, brutal killings began, 
leading to a 100-day genocide, 
during which Hutu extremists killed 
between 800 000 and one million 
Tutsis, moderate Hutus,2 and a few 
Hutu leaders from political parties 
other than the governing party 
(RoR, 2013b: 17; World Bank, 
2019: ix; Howard, 2014).3 This led to 
between two and three million Hutus 
fleeing Rwanda for neighbouring 
countries4 (RoR, 2012: 3; 
Verpoorten, 2005: 331). 
A day after the attacks, a counter-
offensive was launched by the 
military wing of the rebel Rwanda 
Patriotic Front (RPF) - the Rwanda 
Patriotic Army (RPA) - led by the 
then General Paul Kagame (a Tutsi), 
resulting in the RPA capturing Kigali 
on 4 July 1994. On the same day, 
the genocide ceased. The RPA 
declared a cessation of all hostilities 
on 18 July and, on the following day, 
the RPF installed a Broad-Based 
Government of National Unity 
(RoR, 2012: 3; RoR, 2013b: 17; 
HMDT, 2019; World Bank, 2019: ix, 2; 
Hilsum, 1994). Since the country 
was socially, physically and 
economically decimated and 
1 The authors are aware of the deep 
sensitivities with respect to ethnicity in 
Rwanda and the government’s outlawing 
of references to ethnicity in any form of 
political engagement or official documentation 
or communication after the genocide 
(Verpoorten, 2005: 332, 358). The references 
to ethnicity are provided, as they are required 
to understand the genocide.
2 Meaning Hutus that were regarded 
as sympathetic to the Tutsis 
(Verpoorten, 2005: 333-334).
3 At the time, Rwanda’s estimated population 
was between 7 and 7.5 million people 
(Verpoorten, 2005: 332).
4 Primarily, the then Zaire (now the Democratic 
Republic of Congo) and Tanzania 
(Times Reporter, 2007). 
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government institutions severely 
damaged, the new government 
embarked on a programme of 
transformation and nation-building 
(RoR, 2012: 3-4; Turok, 2019: 221; 
World Bank, 2019: ix, 3). 
It was, however, only when Mr Paul 
Kagame became President in March 
2000 that reconstruction efforts took 
off in earnest (World Bank, 2019: 3). 
Core components were to plan and 
manage the reconstruction and 
national rebuilding project from the 
centre, and actively secure foreign 
technical and financial support, 
to prepare and implement the 
country’s plans. The drive to attract 
and sustain foreign investment 
for the reconstruction endeavours 
was supported by demonstrating 
that the country was stable, well-
managed and disciplined, there was 
zero-tolerance for corruption and 
mismanagement, and locals, visitors, 
as well as property and investments 
were safe (Turok, 2019: 222).
A raft of statutes, codes and 
presidential orders and instructions 
was progressively introduced 
and include, most notably, Law 
10/2012 Governing Urban Planning 
and Building in Rwanda and the 
Rwanda Urban Planning Code of 
2019 (ROR, 2019a), providing the 
basis for urban “forward planning”, 
development management, 
and plan implementation. Law 
20/2011 Governing Human 
Habitation in Rwanda defines 
human settlements and criteria 
for such areas (RoR, 2019b).
A key institution in the reconstruction 
project has been the National 
Development Planning and Research 
Directorate (NDPR) in the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning. 
The NDPR’s core functions include 
coordinating national development 
planning between central and 
local government; monitoring 
progress on the realisation of 
development objectives; ensuring 
alignment between development 
plans and budgets, and building 
capacity in the areas of planning, 
monitoring and investment 
(RoR, [n.d.]c; RoR, 2012: 22).
The first flagship document emanating 
from the NDPR was Rwanda Vision 
2020 that was prepared through a 
broad-based national consultative 
process commencing in 1997. 
It was adopted in 2000 and revised 
in 2012 (RoR, 2012). Through 
the highly collaborative process 
followed, Vision 2020 came to be 
regarded as “a bond that holds 
(together) Rwandans as a people 
determined to build a better future” 
(RoR, 2012: i). Vision 2020 identified 
six densely interwoven pillars,5 three 
cross-cutting areas,6 and forty-eight 
performance indicators to be pursued 
in tandem (RoR, 2012: 1; 9-16; 25-30; 
RoR, 2017: 8; Turok, 2019: 222). 
In order to implement the multi-
pronged Vision 2020 in manageable 
portions and detail-out the targets, 
medium-term Economic Development 
and Poverty Reduction Strategies 
(EDPRS)7 were introduced 
(RoR, 2012: 1-2; RoR, 2013b; 
RoR, 2013c). These strategies and 
programmes guide the preparation 
of a myriad of seven-year Sector 
Strategic Plans and Development 
Strategies,8 as well as a detailed 
range of programmes and plans,9 
each based on a solid ‘theory of 
change’ (RoR, 2013a; RoR, 2013b; 
RoR, [n.d.]a). These, in turn, provide 
the developmental guides within which 
5 These are good governance and a capable 
state; human resources development and a 
knowledge-based economy; private sector-led 
development; infrastructure development; 
productive high value and market-oriented 
agriculture, as well as regional and 
international integration (RoR, 2012: 9).
6 These are gender equality; protection 
of environment and sustainable natural 
resources management, and science and 
technology, including ICT (RoR, 2012: 9).
7 The first (EDPRS1) was from 2008 to 2012 
and the second (EDPRS2) from 2013 to 2018 
(RoR, 2012; RoR, 2013c).
8 Including health, education, transport, poverty 
reduction, social protection, rural development, 
green energy production, decentralisation 
of government services, environmental 
management and protection, commodity 
exploration and mapping, government 
institution-building, climate change coping/
mediation, private sector development, as well 
as water and sanitation (RoR, [n.d.]a).
9 Including agriculture, housing, land 
development, green building, reforestation 
and forest protection and management, 
infrastructure, trade, industry and tourism, 
private sector as well as cooperative 
development programmes and plans 
(RoR, [n.d.]a). 
all other plans must be prepared and 
implemented. While many avenues 
for the transformation process 
are targeted, including economic 
development, a key issue is an 
embrace of ‘ordered urbanisation’ and 
a desire to make the country’s urban 
areas ‘more functional and liveable’.10 
While these plans place a strong 
emphasis on Kigali, where half of the 
country’s population is concentrated 
and where a comprehensive 
EuropeAid-financed study into the 
demand for, and supply of housing 
in the city between 2012 and 2022 
was done (Planet Consortium, 2012; 
Lloyd Jones, 2017: 34), it also 
extends into the ‘green/sustainable 
development’ of six secondary cities in 
the country11 (Turok, 2019: 224; Lloyd 
Jones, 2017: 35; Mohd Sharif, 2019).
In order to optimise the little land 
that the very densely populated 
country with its estimated 12.6 
million people has,12 a National Land 
Use Plan was prepared to ensure 
‘optimal utilization’ of land in urban 
and rural areas13 and provide for 
the phasing in of higher density 
housing over the course of the next 
three decades (RoR, 2012: 11, 13; 
UN, 2019a: 5; Mohd Sharif, 2019; 
Planet Consortium, 2012: 32-34). 
It was also envisaged that Urban 
Master Plans would be prepared for 
every town and city in the country. 
While the implementation of these 
plans would be coordinated from 
the centre, the actual work of city 
development and management 
would be done by capable, 
10 Key among these, from the perspective of 
settlement planning, are the Urbanisation and 
Rural Sector Strategic Plan 2018-2014 and 
the National Urbanisation Policy, with the latter 
based on four pillars, namely coordination, 
densification, conviviality, and economic 
growth (Mohd Sharif, 2019: 1).
11 These cities (Rusizi, Rubavu, Musanze, 
Nyagatare, Muhanga, and Huye) are being 
developed in a planned way and through large 
investments, infrastructure and social services 
as part of a national network to connect 
the urban to the rural parts of the country 
(Turok, 2019: 225; Lloyd Jones, 2019: 34).
12 This is the most recent 2019-estimate of the 
United Nations (2019b). This figure is set to 
grow to 23 million in 2050 and to 33.4 million 
in 2100 (United Nations, 2019b).
13 Densities in rural Rwanda are very high, 
putting extreme pressure on the land and 
diminishing the prospects of making a living off 
the land (Lloyd Jones, 2017: 34).
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well-run municipalities working in 
tandem with local communities 
and investors well-connected to 
local structures and organisations 
(RoR, 2012: 13; Turok, 2019: 225). 
This style of grassroots engagement 
is common in planning throughout 
the country, with communities 
extensively involved in such 
endeavours (Turok, 2019: 225; Mohd 
Sharif, 2019; Times Reporter, 2007).
In contrast to many African 
countries, Rwanda actively supports 
urbanisation “as a vehicle to 
accelerate transformation from 
an impoverished rural society to 
a prosperous modern economy”, 
where social and education 
services can be provided more 
readily, more affordably, and at 
scale (Turok, 2019: 224-225; Mohd 
Sharif, 2019). In 2015, it produced 
the National Urbanisation Policy 
that advocates for coherent sectoral 
policies. The core principles that 
guide the policy include sustainability 
and resilience; integrated and 
participatory planning; sustainable 
land use, and appropriate tools for 
urban management (RoR, 2015: 18). 
A “healthy environment” is viewed 
as one that enhances the quality 
of urban life, and in which existing 
informal settlements are upgraded 
and new ones are prevented from 
arising (RoR, 2015: 32-33). 
Progress on implementation 
of the country’s many plans 
and programmes is structured 
under three clusters (Economic, 
Governance and Justice), and is 
meticulously monitored and managed 
from the centre, with Detailed 
Progress Reports prepared on each 
strategy, plan, and programme 
(RoR, [n.d.]b). Government officials 
are also bound by a detailed personal 
contract with the President, called 
“Imihigo”,14 which is aligned with the 
strategic objectives of the central 
government (World Bank, 2019: 3).
In order to fund its plans and 
investments in infrastructure, 
technology, and education, and 
to provide social and healthcare 
14 “Imihigo” is “an ancestral cultural practice 
relating to performance contracts” (Think Tank 
Initiative, 2017).
services, the government had to 
borrow extensively and also make 
use of foreign assistance. Through 
the success of these investments 
and the resulting rapid growth of the 
country’s economy, the government 
has been able to fund roughly 84% of 
its expenses from domestic sources – 
up from 36% two decades ago (World 
Bank, 2019: ix; Turok, 2019: 222; 
Lloyd Jones, 2017: 34). Major 
hindrances to economic development 
include the fact that, since Rwanda 
is landlocked and lacks a quality 
road and railway grid, it is dependent 
on other countries, primarily Kenya 
and Tanzania, for ports, harbours, 
roads, and railways for exports 
and imports (RoR, 2012: 5-7, 14; 
World Bank, 2019: xiii). 
Much has been written about 
President Kagame’s government, 
the style of which some perceive 
to be dictatorial and highly 
interventionist. Concerns have also 
been raised about his amendment 
of the Constitution in 2015, allowing 
him to run for election in 2017 and 
remain in power, possibly until 2034 
(Turok, 2019: 222-223). It has been 
reported that he believes that rapid 
and sustained economic development 
is imperative to full reconciliation 
and lasting peace in Rwanda and 
something he has to accomplish 
during his tenure – a mission that has 
earned him the labels of ‘a doer’, ‘an 
implementer’, and ‘a visionary’ (Mohd 
Sharif, 2019; Turok, 2019: 222).
In addition to this, the country’s 
ambitious plans for reconstruction 
have been criticised for their 
Master Plan style, ‘their disconnect 
from realities on the ground’, their 
blinkered pursuit of international 
trends and fads such as ‘smart 
and eco-cities’, glossy hotels 
and conference facilities, and 
their control-centred mode of 
implementation that has left little 
room for question or critique 
(World Bank, 2019: xiv-xv; Lloyd 
Jones, 2017: 36). There is, however, 
also writing that argues that, while 
these concerns are not without 
merit, there is a lot more to the eye 
than what writers looking in from the 
outside are aware of (Turok, 2019; 
Mohd Sharif, 2019). A common 
question posed is whether there 
was any choice, any other way 
to move forward from the deeply 
fractured and desperate situation 
in which the country found itself in 
1994. Would the institution of a less 
centrally driven, more decentralised 
form of government, planning and 
investment with a possibly slower 
pace of economic growth as outcome 
not have resulted in the creation of 
conditions, in which factionalism and 
strife would have returned and civil 
war very easily have broken out again 
(RoR, 2012: 24)? The Rwandan 
government has alluded to its 
success being “the result of a 
collaborative effort between 
Rwanda and our partners. It is 
a demonstration of what can be 
achieved when we give value to 
ourselves and the work we do, 
when we strive to find solutions 
from the strengths of our culture” 
(RoR, 2012: i, 22). Of major 
importance in this regard is the 
positive sentiment that the success 
has fuelled among the population, as 
noted in the Rwandan government’s 
2017-2024 Seven-Year Government 
Programme: “The progress made 
in less than two decades has given 
Rwandans much hope and belief 
to aspire for greater achievements” 
(RoR, 2017: 7). Besides the official 
opinions, the literature refers to 
the use of bottom-up processes, 
the extensive involvement of 
communities and the private 
sector, the responsiveness of 
the government to local needs 
and opportunities, and the social 
cohesion, active citizenship and 
sense of common national purpose 
inculcated by the government 
(Turok, 2019: 222-224). 
Despite all the planning and the 
focus on alignment and targeting, 
there are suggestions that “there 
is scope for greater consistency 
and alignment between top-down 
and bottom-up processes in order 
to improve the suitability and 
responsiveness of national policies 
and practices to grassroots realities” 
(Turok, 2019: 221, 225-226). 
In the area of urbanisation and city 
building, it has been argued that the 
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country requires, in addition to its 
‘state-of-the-art plans and planning 
tools’, far more built-environment 
professionals than it currently 
has and far more investment in 
developing the national infrastructure 
network and strengthening urban-
rural connectivity, especially 
around the six secondary 
cities (Lloyd Jones, 2017: 36; 
World Bank, 2019: xv).
2.2 The Netherlands
At the end of World War II in 1945, 
the Dutch economy was in tatters, 
with 60% of its productive capacity 
destroyed, its population close to 
starvation, more than half a million of 
its housing stock of 2.2 million units 
either destroyed or damaged, and 
a housing shortage of over 250 000 
units (Sutcliffe, 1996: 264; Bosma & 
Wagenaar, 1995b: 237). In order to 
effectively and efficiently undertake 
the massive reconstruction task that 
was required, the reconstruction 
process was cast as a ‘massive 
technocratic exercise’ (Faludi & 
Van der Valk, 1994: 88). A central 
Ministry of Public Works and 
Reconstruction was created, with 
an engineer as Minister. He not 
only had powers that allowed him to 
overrule municipalities in the process 
of reconstruction, but he also had 
access to a considerable body of 
4 500 public servants in a central 
entity called The Reconstruction 
Service that had already been 
established during the war (Bosma 
& Wagenaar, 1995b: 235; Faludi 
& Van der Valk, 1994: 88).
This arrangement lasted until June 
1950, when the Reconstruction 
Act was passed (see below). 
This returned most of the emergency 
powers of national government to 
the municipalities (Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden, 1950). Funding for 
reconstruction, however, remained 
a centralised function, with the 
national government retaining a 
leading role in all reconstruction 
actions. The Reconstruction Service 
was also closed down in June 1950, 
and most of its staff absorbed in a 
newly created Central Directorate 
of Housing and its branch offices 
in the provinces (Faludi & Van der 
Valk, 1994: 90). Simultaneously, an 
Act on Cooperative Government was 
passed to coordinate and integrate 
the reconstruction actions of all 
national, provincial, and municipal 
government entities and actors 
(Bosma & Wagenaar, 1995c: 278).
While national reconstruction was 
regarded as a comprehensive, 
all-encompassing exercise, the 
Dutch central government accepted 
that its primary concern after the 
war was to first rebuild the country’s 
economy, and only after that 
process was underway, to focus 
on the reconstruction of towns 
and cities and provide housing. 
The first step in this regard was 
the passing of the Reconstruction 
Act in June 1950, which contained 
important initiatives such as the 
preparation of Reconstruction Plans 
by municipalities for the whole, or 
for parts of their areas of jurisdiction. 
These plans had to include damage 
and zoning maps, setting out which 
properties had to be acquired by 
the state to give effect to the plan, 
and detailed development/building 
instructions/regulations. Written 
comments or objections to these 
plans were provided for. While 
the Act empowered municipalities 
to prepare such plans, their final 
approval still lay with the Minister 
of Reconstruction and Social 
Housing. The Act also provided for 
expropriation of land and buildings 
by municipalities, but applications 
for expropriation had to be approved 
by the responsible national minister 
after public inspection, input 
and objections, with the Act also 
prescribing a set route to determine 
a fair amount as compensation in 
cases of expropriation. In addition, 
a national building programme had 
to be prepared by the responsible 
minister, which had to set out all the 
building actions that were scheduled 
for a calendar year in the country. 
Only construction provided for in the 
national programme was allowed, 
and contravention was a punishable 
offence (Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 
1950; Sutcliffe, 1996: 25).
Once the legal and administrative 
machinery had been put in place, the 
actual process of mass settlement 
reconstruction and housing provision 
could begin in earnest, which it did in 
the early 1950s (Sutcliffe, 1996: 26). 
In this exercise, the planners, 
architects and engineers involved 
made extensive use of standardised 
layouts, building plans, and building 
materials, to a large extent driven 
by the need for speed in delivery, 
but also strongly influenced 
by the prevailing modernist 
paradigm of standardisation 
(Wagenaar, 1995: 41; Bosma & 
Wagenaar, 1995a: 52; Bosma & 
Wagenaar, 1995b: 237-238; Bosma 
& Wagenaar, 1995c: 272-273).
While there was broad-based 
political and public buy-in to the 
idea of reconstruction, and the 
necessary legislation had been put 
in place, and able officials deployed, 
there was one big headache – 
funding (Wegs & Ladrech, 1996: 
66; Sutcliffe, 1996: 264). Already 
by 1947, The Netherlands had 
run into balance of payments 
problems, which was threatening 
the entire reconstruction project 
(Inklaar, 1997: 21). While 
‘Reconstruction Loans’ were available 
from the then recently established 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank, and financial aid 
was provided by the United States of 
America (USA), these proved to be 
inadequate for the scale of the task 
at hand (Briggs & Clavin, 1997: 384, 
390; Sutcliffe, 1996: 11).
The big game changer would 
come in the form of the Marshall 
Plan, officially called the European 
Recovery Programme (ERP), which 
was first proposed by the then United 
States Secretary of State, General 
George Marshall, in June 1947, in 
the form of an aid package to the 
value of roughly $20 billion that would 
be offered to all European countries 
(Briggs & Clavin, 1997: 390; 
Sutcliffe, 1996: 22; Inklaar, 1997: 19). 
The Marshall Plan was approved 
by the American Congress on 
2 April 1948, and two weeks later, the 
first aid in the form of grain arrived 
in the Dutch harbour of Rotterdam 
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(Inklaar, 1997: 10). In total, 
The Netherlands would receive over 
$1.1 billion in aid from the USA. 
The plan was not only important for 
the Dutch ‘reconstruction project’ 
in terms of the financial injection 
it made, but also in the form of 
uniting the population as a collective 
responsible for making good on the 
confidence placed by the United 
States of America in their national 
pursuit (Briggs & Clavin, 1997: 390; 
Inklaar, 1997: 13, 32).
The Dutch reconstruction project 
was a huge success. By 1950, 
industrial production had grown 
to nearly 40% above 1938-levels 
(Sutcliffe, 1996: 24, 263; Bosma & 
Wagenaar, 1995b: 238, 241). In the 
area of housing and settlement 
redevelopment, some of the first 
emergency housing to be built 
shortly after the war was of low 
quality, but after the national 
government shifted its focus from 
the economy to housing and towns 
and cities in the early 1950s, this 
changed – the new housing stock 
that was provided at scale was 
of good quality, with the national 
housing backlog all but wiped out 
by the end of the 1950s (Bosma 
& Wagenaar, 1995b: 238-239).
2.3 Insights: Common themes
The two countries discussed provide 
useful insights that South Africa can 
potentially learn from many of the 
initiatives to undertake reconstruction 
and redevelopment. Eight such 
insights are briefly set out below.
2.3.1	 Prioritisation	and	sacrifice
Both countries started off from 
positions of complete destruction, 
with a myriad of pressing needs that 
all demanded attention. Decisions 
were taken to commence with what 
were regarded as the most urgent 
for the country, and once these 
had been addressed, to move 
onto the next sets. In both cases, 
this entailed focused and targeted 
investment and spending, and not 
trying to pursue everything that 
had to be done simultaneously.
2.3.2 Clear national direction 
In both instances, the national level 
of government passed legislation 
that granted it extensive powers to 
prepare plans and undertake national 
reconstruction and development 
planning and investment. The plans 
clearly articulated what goals were to 
be pursued and achieved by when, 
how this was to be accomplished, 
and by whom. In The Netherlands, 
consensus-reaching by all the 
main stakeholders was viewed as 
paramount, attained by high-level 
agreements between government, 
unions and organised business 
on primary national objectives. 
These provided the framework for 
planning by the national government. 
In Rwanda, broad-based stakeholder 
and community engagement is part of 
national planning and is considered 
crucial in ensuring commonality 
of purpose and support for the 
national plans. In both cases, once 
agreements had been reached and 
national plans had been prepared, 
these became blueprints for the 
realisation of the set objectives. 
While they allowed for sub-national 
planning and the preparation of 
plans, this had to be done within 
the framework provided by the 
national scale plans, and in support 
of the national objectives. Planning, 
investing and spending outside these 
parameters were not allowed.
2.3.3 Visionary, principled 
leadership complemented 
by action
In Rwanda and The Netherlands, 
the highest office bearers provided 
visionary leadership and set 
ambitious targets. They saw it as 
their duty to lead their countries out 
of the conditions they were in and 
to serve only this cause. Both sets 
of leaders also made good on 
many of their promises – putting 
words into action and delivering 
results for the people, namely 
improving their living conditions, 
bringing stability, and keeping their 
hopes for a better future alive.
2.3.4 A capable state with 
dedicated institutions 
A common theme is that visionary 
political leadership and lofty promises 
and plans without a capable state 
machinery to back up these plans 
and give effect to them is both 
useless and dangerous. Hence, 
both countries established strong, 
well-staffed and capable central 
bodies that were tasked with 
the overall planning for national 
reconstruction and development, 
coordinating and aligning all state 
and non-state planning, budgeting 
and investment and monitoring, and 
reporting on progress in this pursuit.
2.3.5 Respect for, and use of 
technical expertise
Both cases demonstrate an 
appreciation of the importance 
of technical expertise, from plan 
preparation and budgeting to 
implementation and delivery on the 
ground. There was no room for error, 
and no compromises were made as 
to the use of competent professionals 
to undertake complicated tasks. 
In the case of Rwanda, foreign 
service providers filled the gaps 
in expertise in the country.
2.3.6 Discipline
Leaders in both countries had 
no illusions that plans and good 
intentions, even in the hands of 
capable people, could go wrong if 
there is no clarity on the behaviour 
that is required to ensure the desired 
outcomes. This is not simply about 
specifying the required behaviour, 
but also about monitoring it and 
speedily and effectively attending 
to transgressions. What is clear 
in both cases is the realisation 
that, with new institutions in the 
making, extreme care had to be 
taken to ensure that self-serving 
behaviour was not condoned, but 
punished, to ensure that ‘the wrong 
institutional culture’ had no chance 





Neither The Netherlands nor Rwanda 
had the enormous funds that were 
required to fulfil their reconstruction 
needs and objectives. They sought 
international aid and foreign 
investment to supplement their 
limited resources. Both countries also 
realised that they needed to provide 
safe havens for foreign investments, 
and demonstrate to those they were 
targeting for foreign aid that they 
were ‘good for it’ – in other words, 
that they were disciplined, that they 
did not tolerate corruption and theft 
of public funds, and that the money 
was to be used for the purposes 
for which it had been requested.
2.3.8 Sustained popular support
While the reconstruction efforts in 
both countries were driven from the 
centre, and only allowed sub-national 
manoeuvring within the parameters 
set, there was a clear understanding 
that ‘the people’ had to be engaged 
and consulted in the reconstruction 
process, and constantly informed 
of progress made, to ensure their 
continued support. Both cases 
also demonstrated an appreciation 
of the importance of ‘positive 
messaging’, and the well-planned 
and effective use of the media and 
national events in this endeavour. 




Early in South Africa’s new 
democracy in 1994, President Nelson 
Mandela provided the visionary 
leadership to move from a nation 
scarred by injustice to a ‘rainbow 
nation’, where all would work together 
for a better future for all. An advanced 
Constitution provided the values of 
accountability, transparency and 
non-racism, institutional structure, 
and human rights for all. Government 
took its task of rebuilding the country 
seriously, with one of its main 
projects being rural land reform. 
This promising start was ruined by 
Jacob Zuma’s disastrous presidency 
that was marred by corruption and 
‘state capture’. Renewed hope was 
placed on the shoulders of President 
Cyril Ramaphosa, but political 
infighting and factionalism have 
flawed the start of his presidency, 
perpetuating the paralysis introduced 
by his predecessor. Nevertheless, in 
his 2019 State of the Nation address, 
President Ramaphosa declared that 
faster economic growth requires 
accelerated land reform and that 
government would fast-track efforts 
to identify and release public land 
suitable for smart, urban settlements 
(RSA, 2019a: 15). The inclusion 
of urban areas in the land reform 
agenda marks a significant move 
away from the emphasis on rural 
land reform, putting the focus of 
the debate on ‘urban land reform’, 
where large tracts of well-located 
land for urban development are 
required for developing sustainable 
human settlements (Simkins, 2019). 
The major South African 
constitutional, legislative and 
policy planning frameworks and 
mechanisms that can be employed 
to realise the objective of developing 
sustainable human settlements 
post-expropriation of, or acquisition 
of land, are introduced within some 
of the insights extracted from the two 
international examples discussed.
3.1 Constitutional aspects
Land reform is restricted to the three 
categories of land reform, namely 
‘land redistribution’, ‘land-tenure 
reform’ and ‘land restitution’, as 
included in the Constitution sections 
25(5), (6) and (7) (RSA, 1994a). 
As a result, it is mainly focused on 
rural land and does not adequately 
deal with urban ‘land development’ 
(Pienaar, 2014: 456-459; 647-648). 
The PVA now includes ‘land 
development’ in its definition of 
land reform, but does not define 
it (RSA, 2014). However, a useful 
definition is found in the Spatial 
Planning and Land Use Management 
Act No 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA), 
where ‘land development’ includes 
“the erection of buildings or 
structures on land” (RSA, 2013; 
Pienaar, 2019). This means that 
land can now be expropriated for 
land reform purposes that entail 
development. Hence, urban land 
reform can be accelerated.
The development of sustainable 
human settlements in South 
Africa requires the interaction and 
cooperation of all three spheres 
of government. Although each 
sphere has the autonomy to 
exercise its powers and functions 
within its own area, the powers 
and functions do not operate in 
hermetically sealed compartments, 
and there are links between 
them (Humby, 2015). However, 
these links are often not properly 
understood. Practice shows that a 
silo-approach is still being followed. 
This misunderstanding results in 
a negation of the directive that all 
spheres of government must apply 
principles of cooperative government 
(RSA, 1994a: s41). Without a large 
measure of cooperation, the effective 
development of fair and viable 
human settlements is not possible.
The lack of effective legislation on 
cooperative government seriously 
hampers cooperation, the reason 
being that the Intergovernmental 
Relations Framework Act 13 of 
2005 (RSA, 2005) has not delivered 
on the ideals of section 41 of 
the Constitution (RSA, 1994a). 
In the present self-serving political 
climate that pervades all levels 
of government, cooperation is 
anything but a priority. What 
is clear, particularly from the 
comparative insights obtained, 
is that in any concerted effort to 
deal with urban land reform, all 
spheres of government must work 
cooperatively, and not merely 
with one another, but also with 
the other role players, especially 
affected community members. 
3.2 Legislative context
In line with comparative practice, 
the ideal is to have stand-alone 
legislation that specifically targets the 
development of sustainable human 
settlements. In The Netherlands, the 
legislation was the Reconstruction 
Act and in Rwanda it is Law 
10/2012 Governing Urban Planning 
and Building. In South Africa, the 
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existing land-reform legislation has 
not significantly delivered on what 
was initially planned, as it is geared 
towards rural land reform and the 
three categories of land reform are 
too narrow to cover the development 
of sustainable urban settlements 
(UWC, 2016: 7). With urbanisation on 
the increase, programmes that tackle 
urban land reform are sorely needed. 
While there are a few statutes that 
can play a role towards implementing 
a programme or plan of action for this 
task, there is no statute designed to 
specifically tackle urban land reform. 
What is required is to look beyond the 
existing land-reform legislation and 
find other ways of dealing with urban 
land reform, where both land and 
settlement development are crucial 
components. A useful starting point is 
to examine what is presently on the 
statute book, where the lacunae are, 
and how these can be addressed. 
SPLUMA is one of the most important 
statutes outside the land-reform 
legislation that targets the planning 
aspects of land use. Essential 
to all frameworks, schemes and 
procedures is the principle of 
‘spatial justice’, emphasising that 
past spatial imbalances must be 
redressed through improved access 
to land (s 7(a)). Provision is made 
for national, provincial, regional, 
and municipal Spatial Development 
Frameworks (SDFs) that must all 
include previously disadvantaged 
areas, informal settlements and 
landholdings of state-owned 
enterprises and government 
agencies. SPLUMA stresses that 
their inclusion and integration into 
the spatial, economic, social, and 
environmental objectives of the 
relevant sphere/region, as well as 
historical spatial imbalances in land 
and settlement development, must be 
addressed (SPLUMA s 12(1)(h)-(i)). 
In this regard, the National SDF 
should provide strategic direction 
and policy guidance on addressing 
the persisting problem of historical 
national spatial imbalances and the 
upgrading of informal settlements. 
Municipal SDFs would, in turn, 
then identify the designation of 
areas where incremental upgrading 
approaches to development and 
regulation will be applicable, where 
more detailed local plans must be 
drawn up, and where shortened land-
use development procedures may 
be applicable (SPLUMA s 21(k)-(l)).
SPLUMA states that land reform 
must be dealt with in municipal 
land-use schemes (SPLUMA, s 12). 
It specifically directs land-use 
schemes to include provisions that 
permit the incremental introduction 
of land-use management and 
regulation in the same areas 
as those specified for SDFs, 
as well as areas not previously 
subject to a land-use scheme 
(SPLUMA s 24(2)(c); Nel, 2015).
While the enactment of SPLUMA 
was a necessary and enormous 
shift away from the past planning 
system characterised by inequality, 
unsustainable settlement patterns 
and fragmentation, and it provides 
many opportunities to address urban 
land reform and development, it 
has, since coming into operation in 
2015, shown few signs of translating 
these opportunities into practical 
gains. Executive responsibility for 
SPLUMA lies essentially only with 
the Department of Agriculture, Land 
Reform and Rural Development. 
Implementing a national Act aimed 
at creating sustainable human 
settlements cannot be left to a 
single department; it requires 
sustained, enforced large-scale 
intergovernmental cooperation and 
strong, centralised governance.
Against the background of 
intergovernmental cooperation 
and centralised responsibility, the 
Infrastructure Development Act No 23 
of 2014 (RSA, 2014a) could play 
an important role in enabling the 
development of sustainable human 
settlements. It aims to facilitate and 
co-ordinate public infrastructure 
development that is of significant 
economic or social importance to the 
Republic. It does so by identifying 
and implementing Strategic 
Integrated Projects (SIPs). ‘Human 
settlements and related infrastructure 
and facilities’ is listed as one of the 
SIPs in Schedule 1 to the Act. In 
principle, urban land reform, more 
specifically the development of 
sustainable settlements would fit 
neatly into this SIP. Unfortunately, 
the 2012 National Infrastructure 
Plan, prepared to support the Act, 
all but ignores human settlements 
with the 2016/2017 Report on the 
plan, merely stating that 89 009 new 
houses were built (RSA, 2019c). 
The Act clearly targets other issues 
and it is unclear how it fits into 
the constitutional scheme of the 
allocation of specified legislative 
and executive powers to different 
spheres of government.
While these statutes contain the 
potential to address the development 
of sustainable human settlements, we 
are yet to see it happen in practice.
3.3 Policy context
More so than legislation, policy can 
play a significant role in addressing 
the creation of sustainable human 
settlements. It has done so, but 
not with sufficient success. 
As early as 1994, in the run-up to 
the new dispensation, the African 
National Congress (ANC) produced 
the ambitious Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP), 
which articulates the steps to be 
taken in redressing the imbalances 
of the past and redirecting economic 
development towards building 
a new, free and fair country and 
society (ANC, 1994). In the same 
way as its counterpart, Rwanda: 
Vision 2020, its focus was on major 
socio-economic issues such as 
poverty, unemployment, health, the 
provision of water and electricity, 
education, transport and, crucially, 
the construction of housing for the 
millions of South Africans who, due 
to the legacy of apartheid, could not 
otherwise afford it (ANC, 1994).
The RDP was translated into The 
White Paper on Reconstruction and 
Development, which encapsulated 
the contents of the original document. 
In a similar vein as the reconstruction 
programme of The Netherlands, 
it stated that “[d]ifficult decisions 
will have to be made, including 
the closing of programmes, in 
order to redirect resources and 
staff to RDP priorities” (RSA, 
1994b: 16). In accordance with 
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this view, it introduced the idea of 
‘Transformation Plans’, in terms of 
which all line function departments 
and provinces had to prepare 
five-year strategies, re-orientate 
their programmes, improve their 
efficiency, and enhance their use of 
resources consistent with the RDP. 
It called for the implementation 
of transformation strategies and 
systematic business planning 
exercises for each ministry, tier of 
government and parastatal institution, 
assisted by public enterprises, the 
private sector and NGOs. Both the 
original RDP document and the 
White Paper proposed the enactment 
of a “National Reconstruction and 
Development Act” that would set 
out the procedures that government 
and its agencies had to follow in 
complying with the implementation 
and reporting procedures of the 
reconstruction and development 
project (ANC, 1994: 140; RSA, 
1994b: 17).15 Where the introduction 
of the Reconstruction Act in The 
Netherlands was the catalyst 
behind the redevelopment of the 
country, it is unfortunate that in 
South Africa such legislation, while 
mooted, never saw the light of day. 
Whilst the White Paper contained 
many of the ideals of similar initiatives 
as in Rwanda and The Netherlands, 
its implementation has been far 
from effective. Despite the fact that 
millions of RDP houses have been 
built, the housing crisis has still not 
been resolved. The history of RDP 
housing also reveals worrying levels 
of corruption and mismanagement in 
state social services. The integration 
of the allocated housing areas 
into local and regional economies 
has generally not taken place, 
and the tendency of housing 
projects to perpetuate apartheid 
spatial planning is still noticeable. 
This amounts to a failure of 
progressive, integrated, and people-
centred development envisioned 
by the RDP, where everyone 
works together. A serious rethink is 
urgently needed (Bailey, 2017).
15 The RDP document also called for the 
passing of provincial “Reconstruction and 
Development Acts” (ANC, 1994: 140).
Chapter 8 of the National 
Development Plan 2030 (NDP) 
entitled “Transforming Human 
Settlement and the National Space 
Economy” reiterates the RDP’s 
goals of breaking down apartheid 
geography, building more compact 
cities, providing decent public 
transport and the development of 
industries and services that use 
local resources and meet local 
needs. It recognises the tension 
that exists between the immediate 
necessity of addressing the housing 
backlog and the longer term need to 
create well-functioning, high-quality 
human settlements that offer greater 
opportunities for income-generation 
and human development (RSA, 
2012: 260, 270). However, instead 
of prioritising what is required, it puts 
forward an impossibly detailed list 
of recommendations to reform the 
planning system. Consequently, it 
is difficult in the extreme to prioritise 
and implement. In that regard, the 
recent calls by the National Planning 
Commission to review aspects 
of the NDP are to be welcomed 
(RSA, 2019b). Part of such a review 
should include the prioritisation of the 
most urgent issues; the introduction 
of clear coordination and integration 
processes and implementation 
measures; specifying and adhering to 
timelines; and ensuring that reporting 
on progress is done by capable, 
well-run municipalities working 
together with local communities, 
structures, organisations and 
investors. South Africa can take its 
cue from Rwanda in this regard.
The Integrated Urban Development 
Framework (IUDF) is designed to 
promote inclusive, resilient, and 
liveable cities and towns. It builds 
on various chapters in the NDP and 
extends Chapter 8. One of its aims 
is that, by 2030, South Africa will 
see meaningful and measurable 
progress in creating more 
functionally integrated, balanced 
and vibrant urban settlements. 
Its Policy Lever 3 aptly states that 
integrated and sustainable human 
settlements are needed to create 
more humane, environmentally 
friendly and safe living and working 
conditions. A number of short- to 
medium-term policy priorities are 
identified, including the finalisation 
of the Human Settlements White 
Paper; accelerating the upgrading 
of informal settlements; prioritising 
the regeneration of inner cities; 
redeveloping townships; developing 
a national policy on inclusionary 
housing; and fast-tracking land 
for settlement interventions 
(RSA, 2016a: 63-67). A large 
contingent of key actors is identified 
who must collaborate to reshape 
the built environment within 
municipalities. The IUDF also 
identifies all the issues that must 
be urgently addressed, but being a 
policy, it contains no implementation 
measures or timelines, and it is 
foreseen that the urgency with which 
South Africa must address these 
issues will disappear in the rhetoric. 
One of the ways to get the 
establishment of sustainable 
human settlements off the ground 
at scale and at speed is to upgrade 
existing informal settlements. 
Informal settlements are often 
relatively well-located in terms of 
access to economic opportunities, 
transportation, and social facilities. 
They are essential in providing 
access to the city, especially 
for the very poor (Royston & 
Ebrahim, 2019). They also include 
informal, yet locally institutionalised 
and respected arrangements on 
land governance, activity routes, 
internal neighbourhood blocks, 
locally designated land for social 
use, open space and economic 
activity. These provide markers for 
future layout planning that should be 
respected (Anciano & Piper, 2019). 
Until 2004, government had no 
dedicated policy instrument for 
informal settlement upgrading. 
In September 2004, cabinet 
approved the comprehensive plan 
for sustainable human settlements 
or Breaking New Ground (BNG) 
(RSA, 2009). Its objectives are to 
alleviate poverty, promote economic 
growth, improve the quality of life 
of the poor, create an asset for 
the poor, and develop sustainable 
human settlements. In terms of 
BNG, the concept of ‘sustainable 
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human settlements’ refers to “[w]ell 
managed entities in which economic 
growth and social development 
are in balance with the carrying 
capacity of the natural systems 
on which they depend for their 
existence and result in sustainable 
development, wealth creation, 
poverty alleviation and equity”.
While its aims are laudable, BNG 
has been criticised for its lack of 
clarity on its strategic direction 
and “for appearing confusing 
and disappointing” (Charlton & 
Kihato, 2006: 252-282). However, 
it did result in an important 
initiative – the Upgrading of Informal 
Settlements Programme (UISP). 
The UISP explicitly calls for a 
‘paradigm shift’ and puts forward a 
radically different approach to deal 
with informal settlements. It provides 
a good policy framework to improve 
the lives and livelihoods of people 
living in informal settlements by 
providing secure tenure and access 
to basic services and housing. 
However, implementation has not 
been satisfactory, because the 
relocation of informal settlements 
to vacant land far from cities and 
work opportunities remain common 
practices among municipalities. As a 
result, long-established community 
arrangements, agreements and 
organisations are erased and 
relocated residents are often in a 
worse position than prior to their 
relocation. Moreover, municipalities 
often fail in their duty to undertake 
upgrading projects (RSA, 2016b). 
Despite the misgivings about the 
UISP, its implementation must be 
accelerated. Of all the legislative 
and policy initiatives, the UISP can 
best address urban land reform 
by facilitating the creation of safe, 
viable, and sustainable human 
settlements. Priority should be 
given to areas that are suitable for 
tenure upgrading; the provision of 
municipal and social services and 
space for economic activities; as well 
as alternative housing and service-
delivery models. This can be done by 
government officials, residents and 
local leadership structures working 
in a cooperative arrangement that 
recognises and respects local norms 
and practices and the importance 
of dignity and a sense of belonging 
in the development of vibrant, safe 
and secure human settlements 
(Royston & Ebrahim, 2019).
4. CONCLUSION
Whilst no two countries are alike, it 
is useful to study countries where 
large-scale rehabilitation and 
reconstruction have taken, and are 
taking place. Lessons can be learned 
from the legislation, policies, plans, 
programmes and tools employed 
in such countries. As the research 
into the cases of Rwanda and 
The Netherlands in this article shows, 
only principled, visionary leadership 
can implement such a system. 
A theme that runs through both cases 
is the need for a clear vision that is 
shared by all role players, of what the 
outcome of the reconstruction project 
is to be. Broad-based stakeholder 
and community engagement are at 
the heart of any attempt to attain 
such a vision and to get goal-oriented 
legislation, programmes and policies 
off the ground. Together with that, 
the establishment of capable central 
bodies is imperative to undertaking 
the overall planning for national 
reconstruction and development. 
For such planning to be effective, 
and to attract and retain local 
and foreign investment, requires 
proper, planned implementation 
based on appropriate legislative 
instruments and workable policies.
South Africa has many pressing 
needs, but prioritisation needs to 
take place. Arguably, addressing 
our failing economy is a priority, 
but where and how one lives and 
works are at the core of human 
dignity - i.e. the foundational value in 
our Constitution. The development 
of sustainable human settlements 
must be one of the priorities, not 
only for the present generation, but 
also for generations to come. Many 
of the issues that really require 
urgent attention in South Africa 
also get lost in the detail, because 
prioritisation is lacking.
After prioritisation, an effective, well-
considered programme of legislation 
and policy, supported by appropriate 
plans that are underpinned by 
constitutional principles, norms and 
values must enable action. Words 
cannot do the work. As a nation, we 
must jointly build our capacity; get 
to work, and be efficient, effective 
and dedicated to the cause.
South Africa has an array of 
legislation and policy that can start 
to address the issue. However, 
a more targeted approach that 
addresses our core needs is 
necessary. In addition to the proper 
implementation of existing legislation, 
South Africa needs a proper 
‘national spatial reconstruction act’ 
supported by effective legislation 
on intergovernmental relations that 
guides and directs all national-level 
plans, strategies and frameworks; 
ties in the existing legislation 
and policy; and gives clear and 
binding objectives and instructions 
to provinces and municipalities. 
It must clearly describe what kind 
of national spatial configuration, 
space economy and settlements 
are required. Ultimately, this will 
drive and direct post-expropriation 
spatial reconstruction and 
settlement-building in which local 
and foreign investors would invest 
with confidence. Only then will we 
be able to reap the full dividend of 
land reform, namely the creation of 
equitable, viable, and sustainable 
human settlements for all.
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